Mullin v Richards [1998]: A Case Summary

Case name & citation: Mullin v Richards [1998] 1 WLR 1304; [1998] 1 ALL ER 920

  • Court and jurisdiction: Court of Appeal (Civil Division), England and Wales
  • Decided on: 06 November 1997
  • The bench of judges: Lady Justice Butler-Sloss, Lord Justice Hutchison, Sir John Vinelott
  • Area of law: Negligence; Foreseeability; Standard of care; Duty of care

Case Overview

This is a tort law case on issues of negligence and foreseeability of risk.

Would it be reasonable to expect a young teen to have anticipated the risk of danger?

Should age and other circumstances be considered when determining the standard of care owed in a negligence claim?

The case revolves around these questions.

What happened in Mullin v Richards?

Two fifteen-year-old school friends, Teresa Mullin and Heidi Richards, were playing a game of sword fight with plastic rulers. Mock fighting with rulers was a very common game at school and no one had ever warned them of the dangers associated with it.

While fighting, one of the rulers snapped and a piece of it went into Teresa’s eye, causing significant damage to the eye. Teresa brought legal action against Heidi and the trial judge found Heidi liable for the injury.

The case was appealed.

Court’s judgment

The Court of Appeal held that Heidi was not negligent. She was not in breach of the duty of care she owed to the claimant.

The Court took into consideration the fact that Heidi was only fifteen years old and that in the circumstances, she couldn’t have reasonably foreseen that the game would result in harm.

Games of such kind were played quite frequently at the school and were not prohibited. Given the circumstances, she had no reason to believe that the game they were playing was dangerous.

The Court followed the approach taken in McHale v Watson (1966).

The question for the judge was not whether an ordinary, prudent, and reasonable adult would have recognized the risk but rather whether an ordinary, prudent, and reasonable 15-year-old schoolgirl in the defendant’s situation would have realized the risk of injury.

Hence, she was not liable.

Quote

“This was in truth nothing more than a schoolgirls’ game such as on the evidence was commonplace in this school and there was, I would hold, no justification for attributing to the participants the foresight of any significant risk of the likelihood of injury.”

(As per Hutchinson L.J. at p.1311)

The legal principle in Mullin v Richards

For establishing a tort of negligence, it is important to prove that a duty of care was owed by the defendant and that it was breached. This is judged on the basis of how a reasonable person would have acted in similar situations.

The standard of care is generally objective and does not take into account the specific characteristics such as age, nature, etc. of the defendant. However, this case recognized exceptions to this.

The case was based on the legal principle that a defendant’s identity as a child is relevant to the standard of care. In other words, a child is held to the standard of a reasonable child of the same age, and not to the standard expected of a reasonable adult.

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Roberts v Ramsbottom [1980]: A Quick Summary

Case name & citation: Roberts v Ramsbottom [1980] 1 WLR 823; [1980] 1 All ER 7

Jurisdiction: England and Wales

The learned judge: Neill J.

Area of law: Standard of care; Accident caused after being affected by a medical condition

What happened in Roberts v Ramsbottom?

Arthur Ramsbottom crashed his car into a stationary van and a parked vehicle. The plaintiff who suffered injuries sued the defendant.

The defendant was found guilty of negligence and liable for the accident even though the crash was caused because Ramsbottom had unknowingly suffered a stroke (cerebral hemorrhage) whilst he was driving. This impaired his ability to drive safely.

There was no prior history of strokes with Ramsbottom and also there were no warning signs that he was about to have one.

If Ramsbottom had become completely unconscious due to the stroke, the Court could have given him the defense of automatism. But, because he continued to drive with his consciousness clouded, this defense was not available to him. He was held liable because he continued to drive after suffering a seizure that affected his reactions and that rendered him unfit to do so. He had not completely lost control of his actions and had some awareness of what was happening. Thus, he should have stopped his car immediately.

Quote from the case

Neill J. stated as under:

“I am satisfied that in a civil action, a similar approach should be adopted. The driver will be able to escape liability if his actions at the relevant time were wholly beyond his control. The most obvious case is sudden unconsciousness. But if he retained some control, albeit imperfect control, and his driving, judged objectively, was below the required standard, he remains liable.”

Note:

The decision in Roberts v Ramsbottom was partly disapproved by the Court of Appeal in Mansfield v Weetabix [1998]. Nevertheless, they held that it was rightly decided. As opposed to Roberts v Ramsbottom, the defendant in Mansfield v Weetabix was not found at fault and his standard of care was held to the standard of a sick person unaware of his condition.

Summing up Roberts v Ramsbottom

In short, Roberts v Ramsbottom holds that a driver can be held liable for negligence if he continues to drive despite being aware of his incapacity or despite feeling unwell (in this case due to a stroke).

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Wyong Shire Council v Shirt

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Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980): A Case Summary

The case of Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) addressed the topic of negligence and whether a Council was irresponsible in placing a sign indicating deep water in a local lake when the water was actually shallow.  The Court looked at the standard of care and whether the Council acted appropriately in light of the risk of injury to water skiers under the circumstances. 

Given below are the case details:

Case name & citation:Wyong Shire Council v Shirt [1980] HCA 12; (1980) 146 CLR 40; (1980) 29 ALR 217
The concerned Court:High Court of Australia
Decided on:01 May 1980
The bench of judges:Stephen, Mason, Murphy, Aickin and Wilson JJ.
Area of law:Foreseeability of risk; standard of care; negligence; breach of duty

Facts of the case

In the given case, the plaintiff became a quadriplegic after hitting his head on the bottom of a lake while water skiing. The water was just over a meter deep at that location. The plaintiff claimed that a nearby ‘Deep Water’ sign erected by the Council’s engineer misled him into thinking the lake was normally deep and safe for inexperienced skiers. The sign created a reasonable expectation of deep water throughout the lake making him believe that it was safe for skiing. In reality, the Council had put the sign adjacent to a deep channel dredged though the lake was otherwise shallow.

The plaintiff thus sued the Council alleging negligence by erecting misleading signs.

Issue raised

Was the Council negligent for the injury?

Judgment of the Court in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt

The decision was taken in favor of the plaintiff.

The High Court held that the defendant was negligent despite the fact that the likelihood of someone misinterpreting the signs was low. In addition, it was determined that the Council had not taken adequate steps to address this risk. It would have been relatively simple for the Council to ensure that the signs were explicit as to where the deep water was actually located.

Reasoning and concept behind the decision

In assessing whether a breach of duty has occurred, the key factor is to take into account the relevant risk of injury. The idea is that the foreseeability of a risk of injury is not dependent on the probability or improbability of that injury occurring. Rather, it is about determining whether the risk in question is not “far-fetched or fanciful.” That is, despite being rare or uncommon, if an injury is such that a reasonable person would not dismiss it as highly improbable and is not considered far-fetched or fanciful, then it can be deemed foreseeable.

Once it is established that the risk is foreseeable, the next step is to determine the standard of care that ought to be adopted by a reasonable person in the defendant’s position. Mason J. says that how a reasonable person would respond to the risk calls for the consideration of a number of factors. These include the magnitude of the risk, the degree of probability of the risk’s occurrence, the cost, difficulty, and inconvenience associated with taking actions to mitigate or alleviate the risk, and any other conflicting responsibilities that the defendant may have.

Quotes from the case

Mason J. laid down the common law test for breach of duty as under:

‘…the tribunal of fact must first ask itself whether a reasonable man in the defendant’s position would have foreseen that his conduct involved a risk of injury to the plaintiff or to a class of persons including the plaintiff. If the answer be in the affirmative, it is then for the tribunal of fact to determine what a reasonable man would do by way of response to the risk. The perception of the reasonable man’s response calls for a consideration of the magnitude of the risk and the degree of the probability of its occurrence, along with the expense, difficulty and inconvenience of taking alleviation action and any other conflicting responsibilities which the defendant may have.’

Conclusion (Wyong Shire Council v Shirt)

To evaluate the standard of care, the courts aim to address two things:

1. whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have foreseen that their actions or conduct carried a risk of injury to the plaintiff; and

2. the reasonableness of the defendant’s response to this identified risk.

The objective is to determine whether the actions or precautions taken by the defendant, given their knowledge and circumstances, were in line with what a reasonable person in a similar setting would have done to mitigate or address the risk.

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A Quick Summary of Carrier v Bonham [2001]

Carrier v Bonham [2001] is a classic tort law case that deals with the liability of mentally ill individuals for negligence issues. The case discusses the standard of care that has to be exercised by people suffering from mental illness.

The case facts and decision are as under:

Case name & citation:Carrier v Bonham [2001] QCA 234
Court:Supreme Court of Queensland (Court of Appeal)
Decided on:22 June 2001
The bench of judges:McMurdo P, McPherson JA, Moynihan J
Area of law:Personal Injury; standard of care

Facts of the case (Carrier v Bonham)

John Bonham was a chronic schizophrenic who got away from the Royal Brisbane Hospital. In an attempt to commit suicide, Bonham jumped in front of a passing bus driven by Keith Carrier. Carrier suffered from nervous shock as a result of the dreadful incident. He sued Bonham for negligence.

Initial decision

In the first instance, the case was heard in the Queensland District Court. Judge McGill determined that Bonham had not breached the standard of care owed to Carrier, comparing Bonham’s standard of care to that of a child. However, Bonham was judged accountable under the grounds of the English case “Wilkinson v Downton” [1897], which declared that a defendant is liable for willfully doing an act calculated to cause physical harm to the plaintiff.

Judgment on Appeal

On appeal, the case was then heard in the Queensland Court of Appeal. The analogy made by the trial judge between mental patients and children was rejected. It was found that, unlike childhood, mental illness is not a natural progression to adulthood. Thus, the appeal was denied. The Court found that Bonham’s mental state had no bearing on the standard of care he owed to Carrier. The standard of care was decided to be that of a reasonable and ordinary person. Bonham’s mental state had no effect on his liability and negligence towards Carrier.

Judge McPherson said:

“There is no such thing as a “normal” condition of unsound mind in those who suffer that affliction. It comes in different varieties and different shades or degrees. For that reason, it would be impossible to devise a standard by which the tortious liabilities of such people could be judged as a class.”

Moreover, the idea here is that providing greater freedom and liberty to individuals with mental illness is both a humane and beneficial approach. However, this increased freedom comes with the responsibility of holding mentally ill individuals to the same standard of care as an ordinary person.

Hence, the Court held Bonham liable for his acts notwithstanding his inability to be aware that his activities could damage passengers and his lack of understanding of the potential effects of his actions on others.

Conclusion (Carrier v Bonham)

The case throws light on an understanding that the conduct of those who suffer mental illness should be judged according to society’s standards. Their mental illness does not alter the standard of care owed in negligence cases.

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