A Case Analysis of Symes v Mahon [1922]

Case name & Citation: Symes v Mahon [1922] SASR 447

  • The learned judge: Murray CJ
  • Court and jurisdiction: The Supreme Court of South Australia, Adelaide, Australia
  • Area of law: False imprisonment; Psychological restraint

Symes v Mahon [1922] SASR 447 is a significant case in the context of false imprisonment under common law. This case illustrates the principle that false imprisonment does not necessarily require physical restraint; rather, submission to the authority and control of another, under the reasonable belief that there is no means of escape, can constitute false imprisonment.

Case Summary (Symes v Mahon)

In Symes v Mahon, a police officer mistakenly identified the plaintiff as the subject of an arrest warrant for failing to maintain an illegitimate child. The officer informed the plaintiff of the warrant and requested that the plaintiff accompany him to Adelaide. In those circumstances, the plaintiff agreed to meet the officer at the local railway station the following morning to travel to Adelaide. However, the officer repeatedly told the plaintiff that he was not under arrest (i.e., there was an arrest warrant against him).

During the journey:

  • The plaintiff paid his own fare and travelled in a separate compartment from the officer.
  • Upon arrival in Adelaide, the officer allowed the plaintiff and his wife to take their luggage to a nearby hotel while he waited.
  • The plaintiff then returned to the officer, and they proceeded to the watchhouse together.

Eventually, it was determined that the plaintiff was not the individual sought by the warrant, and he was allowed to leave. The plaintiff sued for false imprisonment.

The Findings of Court

Chief Justice Murray’s analysis focused on the concept of false imprisonment without physical force. Key points from his findings include:

1. Submission to Control: The plaintiff submitted to the police officer’s control, believing there was no reasonable means of escape. This submission was critical in establishing false imprisonment, even though there was no physical restraint.

2. Reasonable Belief of No Escape: The plaintiff’s belief that he had no reasonable way to escape was a significant factor. Although the plaintiff had some freedom of movement (e.g., traveling to the hotel), the overarching control and the threat of arrest constituted a form of imprisonment.

3. Evidence of Imprisonment: The court held that the evidence showed the plaintiff’s complete submission to the officer from the time he boarded the train until he was taken to the watchhouse, thereby establishing false imprisonment.

Murray CJ stated that false imprisonment could occur without physical force if there was “evidence of complete submission by [the plaintiff] to the control of the other party.” He emphasized that the plaintiff had placed himself “in the power of the defendant” and acted under the belief that he had no viable alternative but to comply with the officer’s instructions.

Legal Principles on which the case of Symes v Mahon is based

False Imprisonment Elements:

1. Complete Submission: For false imprisonment to be established, the plaintiff must demonstrate complete submission to the control of the defendant, implying that the plaintiff reasonably believed there was no escape.

2. No Physical Force Required: Physical restraint is not a necessary element of false imprisonment. It is sufficient if the plaintiff’s freedom of movement is constrained by authority or control.

3. Reasonable Belief: The plaintiff must reasonably believe that they cannot escape the situation imposed by the defendant’s control.

Conclusion

Symes v Mahon underscores that false imprisonment can be established through psychological or authoritative control, without physical force. The case highlights the importance of the plaintiff’s reasonable perception of being unable to escape the defendant’s authority, which can substantiate a claim of false imprisonment. The principles from this case remain relevant in evaluating similar claims where physical restraint is absent but control and submission are evident.

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Herd v Weardale Steel, Coal & Coke Co Ltd [1915] AC 67

Case name & citation: Herd v Weardale Steel, Coal & Coke Co Ltd [1915] AC 67

  • Jurisdiction: England and Wales 
  • Court: House of Lords 
  • Judge: Viscount Haldane LC
  • Area of law: False imprisonment

Facts (Herd v Weardale Steel)

The plaintiff, a miner, agreed to work in a mine from 9:30 am to 4:00 pm. During his shift, he decided to strike due to a task he considered dangerous and demanded to be returned to the surface at 11:00 am. The defendants, his employers, refused to lift him to the surface before the end of his scheduled shift. He was not brought up until 1:30 pm. The miner claimed damages for false imprisonment, arguing that he was detained against his will since the lift was the only means of exit.

Issue

The central issue was whether the miner’s detention, because he was not allowed to use the lift to exit the mine, constituted false imprisonment.

Judgment

The House of Lords held that the defence of consent was available to the employer. The key points in the judgment were:

-The miner had voluntarily descended into the mine to work his agreed shift.

-The employers were under no obligation to bring the miner back to the surface before the end of the shift.

-It was ruled that holding the miner to the terms he had agreed upon did not constitute false imprisonment.

-The court invoked the principle of volenti non fit injuria, meaning that one cannot claim injury from a risk one has voluntarily accepted. Here, the miner willingly entered the mine under the agreed terms and conditions.

A Similar Case

Balmain New Ferry Co Ltd v Robertson [1906]:

In this case, the plaintiff was held to the contractual obligation of paying an exit fee, which was argued to constitute false imprisonment when he was detained for non-payment.

Both Herd and Robinson have been criticized by some people. Criticism of these decisions has been based on concerns that they could potentially allow situations where a person could be effectively imprisoned for merely breaching a contractual obligation (such as staying in the mine until the end of the shift), which might seem harsh or unjust in certain circumstances.

Summary

Overall, the case of Herd v Weardale Steel, Coal & Coke Co Ltd is significant in its application of the principle of volenti non fit injuria in the context of employment contracts and confinement, establishing that consent to enter into a potentially confining situation can negate claims of false imprisonment.

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Balmain New Ferry Co Ltd v Robertson [1906]

Case name & citation: Balmain New Ferry Co Ltd v Robertson (1906) 4 CLR 379; [1906] HCA 83

  • The concerned Court: High Court of Australia
  • Decided on: 18 December 1906
  • The bench of judges: Griffith C.J., Barton and O’Connor, JJ.
  • Area of law: Implied terms in contract; false imprisonment

Facts of the Case (Balmain New Ferry Co Ltd v Robertson)

In Balmain New Ferry Co Ltd v Robertson (1906), the defendants, Balmain New Ferry Company, operated a ferry service that required passengers to pay a penny upon entry to the wharf and another penny upon exit. A clear notice at the wharf stipulated this rule: “a fare of one penny must be paid on entering or leaving the wharf. No exception will be made to this rule, whether the passenger has travelled by ferry or not.” The plaintiff, Robertson, paid the entry fee but missed the ferry. He then decided not to travel and attempted to leave the wharf, refusing to pay the exit fee. The defendants prevented him from leaving until he paid the penny required for exit.

Issue

The central issue was whether the defendants’ refusal to allow Robertson to leave the wharf without paying the exit fee amounted to false imprisonment.

Judgment in Balmain New Ferry Co Ltd v Robertson

The court held that there was an implied term in the contract between the ferry company and Robertson that required the payment of the penny to exit the wharf. Given that Robertson had used the wharf on many previous occasions, he was deemed to be aware of the conditions set out in the notice.

Reasoning

The court concluded that Robertson was bound by the relevant clause, as it was reasonable to expect him to have known about it due to his prior use of the wharf. The court further held that the defendants were not liable for false imprisonment because the condition that one penny be paid on exit was reasonable.

Analysis of False Imprisonment 

To constitute false imprisonment, there must be a total restraint on the plaintiff’s freedom of movement. In this case, the court found no false imprisonment since Robertson could have avoided the situation by paying the penny, which was a reasonable condition of his entry and exit from the wharf.

The situation was distinguished from total restraint, as seen in Bird v Jones, where it was established that a partial restraint is insufficient to constitute false imprisonment. In the Balmain case, since the plaintiff could have left the wharf by water, there was no total restraint on his movement, further supporting that there was no imprisonment.

Comparison to Other Cases

The reasoning in this case was similar to Herd v Weardale Steel Co Ltd, where the court held that an employer was not liable for false imprisonment when a miner was refused permission to be brought to the surface before the end of his shift, based on the miner’s contractual obligations.

Conclusion (Balmain New Ferry Co Ltd v Robertson)

The case established that an occupier of premises could impose reasonable restrictions on the right of visitors to leave, without being liable for false imprisonment. The restrictions must be reasonable, and the implied consent of the visitor, based on awareness of the terms, plays a crucial role in determining the legality of the restraint.

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Bird v Jones (1845): A Case Summary

Case name & Citation: Bird v Jones (1845) 7 QBR 742; (1845) 115 ER 668

  • Court and jurisdiction: Queen’s Bench Division, England & Wales
  • Decided on: 11 January 1845
  • The learned judge: Lord Denman, C.J.
  • Area of law: False imprisonment

The case of Bird v Jones (1845) is a pivotal decision in English tort law that elaborates on the distinction between false imprisonment and mere interference with freedom of movement. Here is a detailed breakdown:

Facts of the Case (Bird v Jones)

A section of a public highway was cordoned off and reserved for spectators of a boat race, who paid for seats. The plaintiff wished to enter this area and was initially stopped by the defendant’s agents. After managing to climb over the enclosure, he was confronted by two policemen stationed to prevent him from proceeding in the direction he wished to go. Although the plaintiff was free to move in other directions, he chose to stay where he was, refusing to leave for some time.

Legal Issues

The primary legal issue was whether the actions of the defendant and his agents constituted false imprisonment. False imprisonment is defined as the complete restriction of a person’s freedom of movement without lawful justification. The court had to decide if preventing the plaintiff from proceeding in his chosen direction, while allowing him freedom to go in other directions, met the criteria for false imprisonment.

Judgment and Reasoning

The court ruled in favor of the defendant, concluding that the plaintiff’s situation did not amount to false imprisonment. Key points from the judgment include:

1. Complete Deprivation vs. Partial Obstruction:

For imprisonment to be established, there must be a “total restraint of the liberty of the person in question.” There will be no imprisonment if a person “merely obstructs the passage of another in a particular direction,” leaving the obstructed person “at liberty to stay where he is or to go in any other direction if he pleases.”  

Patteson J stated that imprisonment involves a total restraint of liberty, not just a partial obstruction or inconvenience. The plaintiff was not completely confined because he could move in other directions.

2. Means of Escape:

Restraint of liberty is not total if there are reasonable means of escape. In this case, since the plaintiff could move freely in other directions, his liberty was not entirely restrained.

3. No Need for Physical Force:

Coleridge J noted, in obiter dictum, that detention does not require physical force; it could be achieved by compulsion of will or through obstacles. However, the plaintiff must be entirely confined to a specific location for it to constitute false imprisonment.

Legal Principles Established

The case established that:

  • False imprisonment requires a complete deprivation of freedom of movement.
  • Partial obstructions or mere inconveniences do not meet the threshold for false imprisonment.
  • The presence of alternative routes or directions negates the claim of total restraint.

Quotes from the Judgment

Patteson J: “Imprisonment is, as I apprehend, a total restraint of the liberty of the person, for however short a time, and not a partial obstruction of his will, whatever inconvenience it may bring on him.”

Coleridge J (obiter): “There is no need for any force to be applied to the claimant for there to be a detention. All that is required is that the claimant is completely confined to a particular location, which can be by force, compulsion of will or using some obstacle.”

Conclusion (Bird v Jones)

The case of Bird v Jones is a landmark in distinguishing between complete deprivation of liberty (false imprisonment) and mere interference with freedom of movement. It underscores that for a claim of false imprisonment to succeed, there must be a total restraint of liberty without any reasonable means of escape, rather than just an inconvenience or partial obstruction. This decision clarifies that obstructing someone’s passage in a particular direction does not constitute imprisonment if the person is still free to stay where they are or move in other directions.

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Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991]: A Case Summary

Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] is an Australian tort law case concerning the detainment of a customer at a departmental store. The question arose as to whether his detainment was lawful and whether damages should be awarded to him.

Given below are the case details:

Case name & citation: Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597

  • The concerned Court: Supreme Court of Victoria Appeal Division
  • Decided on: 13 November 1990
  • The bench of judges: Murphy, O’Bryan, and McDonald JJ
  • Area of law: Trespass to person; False imprisonment; Total restraint

Facts of the case (Myer Stores Ltd v Soo)

Mr. Soo was shopping at Myer’s hi-fi department store. A security officer at the store believed Soo was a shoplifting suspect based on some store footage.

He informed the police and directed them to escort Mr. Soo. The security officer and a few policemen asked Soo to accompany them to an office to resolve the matter, even though he denied the accusation and was reluctant to do so. Soo was kept in the office for an hour. Soo cooperated fully during the interview and provided personal details and even receipts of purchases to prove his innocence.

Later police searched Soo’s home based on a warrant issued to them. No evidence was found and Mr. Soo also agreed to attend the police station for a further interview. Nothing was found and Soo was ultimately declared innocent of the allegations.

Soo brought legal proceedings against Myer and the police officers for wrongful detention and imprisonment.

He was very unhappy with how he was treated by the department store staff and the police officers. He alleged that Myer had “wrongly directed and procured members of the police force to detain” him.

Issue raised

The key question was whether the above circumstances constituted false imprisonment of Soo.

Judgment of the Court

In the initial hearing, the trial judge was sympathetic to the police but found against the department store, Myer.

Myer then appealed to the Victorian Supreme Court (Appeal Division).

The Court decided that Soo had been falsely imprisoned.

Soo’s escort to the security office and his detention for questioning there amounted to a complete restraint without legal authority.

This action was deemed a serious wrong, and as a result, Soo was awarded $10,000 in damages. He was awarded aggravated damages as his treatment was seen as a “significant insult to an innocent man.”

Justice Murphy watched the store footage multiple times. He reached the view that it was not reasonably open for anyone to identify Mr. Soo as a shoplifter. Justice Murphy also expressed concern that the police managed to obtain a search warrant with so little evidence.

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Kuru v NSW [2008]: A Case Summary

Kuru v NSW [2008] is a tort law case on issues of trespass and false imprisonment.

Case name & citation: Kuru v State of New South Wales [2008] HCA 26; (2008) 236 CLR 1

  • The concerned Court: High Court of Australia
  • Decided on: 12 June 2008
  • The bench of judges: Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ
  • Area of law: Trespass to land; False imprisonment; Domestic violence; Trespass to person

Quick Outline

1. On getting a report, police entered a house to check if there was violence.
2. Upon arrival, there were no ongoing arguments.
3. The house owner asked the police to leave, but the police refused. A physical struggle ensued.
4. Held: The police no longer had a legal basis to remain on the property. It was trespassing from the time it was asked to leave.

Facts of Kuru v State of NSW

The incident occurred on 16 June 2001 when six police officers went to Mr. Kuru’s house after receiving a report that a man and a woman were fighting. By the time police arrived, the argument between Kuru and his fiancée had ended and she had left with Kuru’s sister.

When the police entered, two of Kuru’s friends were in the living room and he was in the shower. When he came out, he allowed the police to look around. He said that his fiancée had already left and gave his sister’s telephone number.

Then he asked the police to leave. But the police refused to leave after repeated demands.

Mr. Kuru jumped on the kitchen bench to gain their attention and later moved towards the police with his arms outstretched, making physical contact with an officer.

A physical struggle ensued and Kuru was punched, sprayed with capsicum spray, and handcuffed. He was then taken into custody.

Legal proceedings

Mr. Kuru brought action against the State of NSW in the NSW District Court and claimed damages for trespass to his person and property and false imprisonment. He was awarded damages of $418,265.

The State of NSW appealed to the NSW Court of Appeal. The appeal was allowed. The police were not considered trespassers when Mr. Kuru first made contact with one officer. The police had a statutory right to stay there as they were investigating whether domestic violence was committed.

Kuru appealed to the High Court of Australia.

Judgment of the High Court in Kuru v State of NSW

The High Court allowed the appeal with a 4:1 majority. The main question was whether the police were trespassing at the time of the physical encounter with Mr. Kuru.

The police did not have statutory or common law powers to stay at Kuru’s house. As per Section 357F of the Crimes Act, police were entitled to enter or remain even if the occupier of the house objected provided that the police were invited by a domestic violence victim.

However, in this case, the police were not invited by a domestic violence victim.

In addition, Section 357H provided that police who entered a house by invitation or with a warrant could remain there only as long as needed to investigate whether an offense had been committed, to render aid to an injured person, to make an arrest, to prevent further offenses, etc.

The police, in this case, had already inspected the house and did not need to stay to speak to the fiancée.

After Kuru had asked them to leave, the police were not entitled by Sections 357F or 357H to remain at the house.

Also, the common law recognized that trespass on land could be justified in emergencies, but in this case, there was no danger to life or property, and no emergency situation.

Mr. Kuru’s refusal or withdrawal of permission for the police to enter or remain on the property could not be overridden in this case.

Conclusion

The High Court held that the police officers refused to leave Kuru’s house after he asked them to do so and engaged in a physical struggle with him. They had committed a trespass to his person as well as his property.

References:

High Court of Australia. (n.d.). https://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/judgment-summaries/2008/hca26-2008-06-12.pdf

Nedim, U. (2020, May 6). Can police enter and leave my property as they please?. Sydney Criminal Lawyers. https://www.sydneycriminallawyers.com.au/blog/can-police-enter-and-leave-my-property-as-they-please/


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Mcfadzean v CFMEU [2007]: A Case Summary

Mcfadzean v CFMEU is a case on the tort of false imprisonment. Some environmentalists took part in anti-logging protests and were allegedly imprisoned by logging workers.

Given below are the case details:

Case name & citation:McFadzean v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2007] VSCA 289; (2007) 20 VR 250
Court:Supreme Court of Victoria (Court of Appeal)
Decided on:13 December 2007
The bench of judges:Warren CJ, Nettle and Redlich JJA
Area of law:False imprisonment

Facts of Mcfadzean v CFMEU

The appellants were a group of protestors who were protesting against logging in a Victorian forest area.

The defendants (logging workers) set up a picket line near the protest site to prevent the protestors from leaving without permission. However, there was an alternative route through the bush for making the exit.

Issue

Were the group of protestors falsely imprisoned in the forest?

Judgment of the Court in Mcfadzean v CFMEU

The protestors could have called the police for assistance to escort them out but this did not mean that they were not falsely imprisoned until the release was effected. However, they could have also used another escape.

An alternative exit route through the bush was both available as well as reasonable. Though it involved a physically difficult walk out of the forest, it was still not an unreasonable means of egress.

Further, the Victorian Supreme Court of Appeal found that the protestors had stayed in the forest not solely because of the defendants’ conduct but for their own reasons. They wanted to do their protest in order to stop logging.

They had their own reasons for remaining at the site, independent of the defendants’ actions.

Thus, the Court decided in favor of the defendants. The appellants were not falsely imprisoned.

Reasoning behind the decision

There can be no false imprisonment if there is a reasonable means of escape.

Quotes from the case

The judges stated as under:

“Be all that as it may, however, it remains that the essence of the action of false imprisonment is the compelling of a person to stay at a particular place against his or her will. Accordingly, where a plaintiff has full knowledge and comprehension of the defendant’s coercive conduct amounting to total restraint, the action depends upon proof that, were it not for the defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff would not have submitted to the restraint.  Consequently, it is not sufficient in law that conduct of the defendant has contributed to or influenced the plaintiff’s decision to remain unless the conduct has overborne the plaintiff’s will.  It must be shown that, but for the defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff would not have yielded to the total restraint; that the plaintiffs’ determination to remain was a coercive consequence of the defendant’s acts.”

“In each case, it is a question of fact as to whether a restriction is so severe as to be characterised as false imprisonment.  For example, if a victim is confined to an island, and the only means of egress is by swimming through dangerous waters to the mainland, there is no reasonable means of egress and the victim’s confinement to the island is likely to amount to false imprisonment.  If, however, there is a reasonable means of egress or escape from detention, the restriction may not be enough.  So, if a victim is confined to a room, and there is a reasonable means of egress through a door, the victim is in effect free to leave the room and there is no false imprisonment.”

(Warren CJ, Nettle and Redlich JJA at [41 & 42])

Refer to the full text of the case here: https://jade.io/article/72278

References:

Civil Trials Bench Book – Particular Proceedings – Intentional torts. The Judicial Commission of NSW. (n.d.). https://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/benchbks/civil/intentional_torts.html

University of Technology Sydney Law Research Series. AustLII. (n.d.). http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UTSLRS/2011/3.html#fn103

Dls. (2022, June 5). McFadzean and Others v Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union and Others: 13 Dec 2007. swarb.co.uk. https://swarb.co.uk/mcfadzean-and-others-v-construction-forestry-mining-and-energy-union-and-others-13-dec-2007/


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