Smith v Jenkins [1970]: Can Criminals Sue for Negligence?

Smith v Jenkins [1970] HCA 2; (1970) 119 CLR 397

•            Date: 6 February 1970

•            High Court of Australia

•            Barwick C.J., Kitto, Windeyer, Owen and Walsh JJ.

•            Negligence; Public policy; Duty of care

The case Smith v Jenkins (1970) [HCA 2; (1970) 119 CLR 397] before the High Court of Australia centers on issues of negligence and public policy. The court examined whether a plaintiff engaged in illegal activity with the defendant could recover damages for personal injuries caused by the defendant’s negligence.

Key Facts (Smith v Jenkins)

Illegal Joint Activity: The plaintiff and the defendant were unlawfully using a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent, constituting a breach of Section 81(2) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Victoria).

Injury During Illegality: The plaintiff sustained injuries due to the negligent driving of the defendant while jointly engaged in the unlawful use of the vehicle.

Lower Court Ruling: The Supreme Court of Victoria awarded damages to the plaintiff for negligence.

Legal Issues

Duty of Care in Criminal Context: Does a duty of care arise between parties jointly involved in a criminal act?

Public Policy Concerns: Should courts deny assistance in enforcing claims where the underlying activity is illegal?

Decision (Smith v Jenkins)

The High Court allowed the appeal, holding that:

No Duty of Care: The relationship between the parties, being one of joint criminality, does not create a duty of care enforceable in law. The court emphasized that such relationships fall outside the protective scope of negligence law.

Public Policy: The court declined to provide remedies for harm arising directly from the execution of a criminal enterprise. Recognizing a duty of care in such circumstances would contradict public policy principles.

Rationale

The court relied on the principle that participants in a criminal act are considered joint wrongdoers and cannot seek indemnity or damages against one another for injuries caused during the execution of their criminal conduct.

The doctrine of ex turpi causa non oritur actio (“no action arises from a dishonourable cause”) applies, preventing recovery for injuries sustained in the course of illegal activity.

This decision reinforces the notion that public policy considerations limit the enforceability of claims arising from illegal acts, particularly when the alleged negligence is intertwined with the criminal enterprise.

References:

https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/cth/HCA/1970/2.html


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Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Ltd: High Court on Gambling Law

Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Ltd [2013] HCA 25; (2013) 250 CLR 392; 87 ALJR 708; 298 ALR 35

  • High Court of Australia
  • The bench of judges: French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ
  • Date of judgment: 5 June 2013
  • Area of law: Equity – Unconscionable conduct

Case Overview (Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Ltd)

The case of Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Ltd [2013] HCA 25 dealt with claims of unconscionable conduct under equitable principles. The appellant, Harry Kakavas, a high-stakes gambler with a pathological gambling disorder, argued that Crown Melbourne Ltd exploited his gambling addiction for financial gain. He sought relief for his losses totalling $20.5 million, incurred over 30 visits to the casino between 2005 and 2006.

Key Issues

1. Special Disability: Kakavas claimed his gambling addiction constituted a special disability, making him vulnerable to exploitation.

2. Unconscionable Conduct: He alleged that Crown knowingly took advantage of his addiction by incentivizing his gambling through perks like private jets and rebates.

Court Decisions in Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Ltd

Trial and Appeals

The lower courts dismissed Kakavas’ claims, ruling that his gambling addiction did not amount to a special disadvantage sufficient to warrant equitable relief. Crown’s actions were deemed part of its normal business operations.

High Court Decision

1. The High Court upheld the lower courts’ decisions, emphasizing that Kakavas was capable of making rational decisions and negotiating terms, indicating no substantial inequality in bargaining power.

2. It ruled that a “special disadvantage” must impair an individual’s ability to act in their best interests across contexts, not just in isolated circumstances. Kakavas’ successful business activities and stable personal life undermined his claim of such a disadvantage.

3. The Court rejected the notion that Crown’s conduct was unconscionable, reasoning that Kakavas’ losses arose from his decisions rather than any exploitation.

Broader Implications

The judgment narrowed the application of equitable relief for unconscionable conduct, limiting it primarily to cases involving profound disabilities impacting general life functions.

Critics argue the decision sets a precedent that wealthier individuals, regardless of disabilities in specific contexts (e.g., gambling addiction), are less likely to qualify for equitable protection.

It effectively closed the door on similar claims by problem gamblers, reinforcing the legality of casinos’ practices as business norms.

Conclusion

This case illustrates a judicial reluctance to intervene in commercial gambling transactions and a tightening of the doctrine of unconscionable conduct.

References:

https://www8.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UWSLRev/2013/8.pdf


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Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd (1982)

Case name & citation: Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd [1982] HCA 44; (1982) 149 CLR 191; 42 ALR 1; 56 ALJR 715

  • High Court of Australia
  • Decision date: 11 August 1982
  • The bench of judges: Gibbs C.J., Mason, Murphy, Brennan JJ
  • Area of law: Trade Practices—Consumer protection—Misleading or deceptive conduct

The case Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd (1982) revolves around the application of Section 52(1) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), which prohibits conduct that is misleading or deceptive, or likely to mislead or deceive.

Background of the case

Puxu Pty Ltd manufactured and sold “Post and Rail” furniture, specifically the “Contour” range of lounge suites, since 1976–1977. These products were well-advertised and had a distinctive design but were not protected under the Designs Act 1906.

Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd began manufacturing the “Rawhide” range of furniture in 1978. This range closely resembled Puxu’s “Contour” range in appearance and design but was of lower quality and price.

Claims by Puxu

Puxu alleged that Parkdale’s conduct in manufacturing and marketing the “Rawhide” range was misleading or deceptive under Section 52(1). It argued that the similarity in design could lead customers to believe the “Rawhide” products were part of Puxu’s “Contour” range, thereby damaging its reputation and market.

Evidence of Misleading Conduct

Instances were cited where customers mistook “Rawhide” furniture for Puxu’s “Contour” furniture. However, these incidents often involved retailers removing labels or providing misleading information, actions not directly attributable to Parkdale.

Court Decisions in Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd

1. Trial Court: Found no evidence that Parkdale intentionally misled consumers or engaged in deceptive conduct. It held that labelling the “Rawhide” products adequately distinguished them from Puxu’s products.

2. Federal Court (Full Bench): Reversed the trial court’s decision, finding that the close resemblance between the products created an inherent potential for deception, regardless of labelling.

3. High Court of Australia (Final Appeal): Allowed Parkdale’s appeal, ruling that:

•            The mere resemblance in design does not constitute misleading or deceptive conduct if proper labelling distinguishes the products.

•            Parkdale’s labelling practice satisfied Section 52, as reasonable consumers were expected to examine labels when purchasing high-value items like furniture.

Given below are some excerpts from the judgment of Chief Justice Gibbs:

“An ordinary person who read the label could not possibly be deceived or misled.” (at p197)

“If the label is removed by some person for whose acts the defendant is not responsible, and in consequence the purchaser is misled, the misleading effect will have been produced, not by the conduct of the defendant, but by the conduct of the person who removed the label.” (at p200)

“To prove a breach of s. 52 it is not enough to establish that the conduct complained of was confusing or caused people to wonder whether two products may have come from the same source.” (at p199)

“The freedom to copy and sell any article on the market is a corollary of the policy of the law against monopolies.” (at p221)

Key Principles Established

Section 52(1): Does not create monopoly rights for manufacturers; its purpose is to prevent consumer deception.

Consumer Standard: The standard for deception considers ordinary, reasonable consumers, who are expected to exercise some care in their purchases.

Copying and Competition: Copying designs in itself does not violate Section 52 unless accompanied by misleading conduct.

Outcome (Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd)

The High Court ruled in favour of Parkdale, emphasizing that consumer protection under Section 52 must be balanced with the principles of free competition and the absence of statutory design protection.

References:

https://jade.io/article/67003


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Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 60

Case name & citation: Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 60; (2004) 218 CLR 592; 79 ALJR 308; 212 ALR 357

  • Court: High Court of Australia
  • Date of Decision: 2 December 2004
  • Judges: Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Kirby, Hayne, and Heydon JJ

Case Overview

This case revolved around claims of misleading or deceptive conduct by Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Limited, a real estate agency, under Section 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). The appellants, Jeffrey Gordon Butcher and Judith Kay Radford, alleged that they were misled by a brochure provided by the real estate agency during the purchase of a waterfront property. The brochure contained a survey diagram, which inaccurately showed the swimming pool as being entirely within the property’s freehold boundary.

Key Facts of Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Ltd

1. Property Purchase:

In 1997, the appellants purchased a waterfront property at 10 Rednal Street, Mona Vale, Sydney, for $1.36 million, intending to develop it. They relied on a promotional brochure provided by Lachlan Elder Realty.

2. Disputed Brochure:

The brochure featured a survey diagram and disclaimers. The diagram implied the swimming pool was entirely within the freehold land. In reality, the property boundary traversed the pool, and parts of the pool fell within a permissive occupancy area controlled by the Crown.

3. Reliance on Brochure:

The appellants, intending to renovate and potentially relocate the pool, claimed they relied on the brochure’s representation. They argued they would not have purchased the property if they had known the true boundary.

4. Legal Action:

The appellants sued the vendor and the real estate agent for misrepresentation and misleading conduct.

Claims against the vendor resulted in partial success, but the High Court case focused on the claims against the real estate agent.

Legal Issues

•            Did the real estate agent engage in misleading or deceptive conduct under Section 52 of the Trade Practices Act by distributing the brochure?

•            Did the disclaimers in the brochure protect the agent from liability?

Court Findings in Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Ltd

1. Trial Court:

The agent did not engage in misleading or deceptive conduct. The brochure included disclaimers explicitly advising potential buyers to verify information independently. The agent was found to be merely passing on information provided by the vendor.

2. Court of Appeal:

Upheld the trial court’s decision, emphasizing the agent’s role as a conduit of information. The disclaimers were deemed effective in mitigating liability.

3. High Court Decision:

Majority (Gleeson CJ, Hayne, and Heydon JJ): Agreed with the lower courts. The disclaimers and the context of the transaction made it clear the agent was not representing the survey’s accuracy. The appellants were experienced and were purchasing a high-value property, had legal advice, and had ample opportunity to verify the information independently.

Dissent (McHugh J): Believed the agent’s conduct was misleading, as the survey diagram was part of a promotional brochure that implied accuracy.

The judges remarked as under:

“The agent did no more than communicate what the vendor was representing, without adopting it or endorsing it.”

“It would have been plain to a reasonable purchaser that the agent was not the source of the information which was said to be misleading. The agent did not purport to do anything more than pass on information supplied by another or others.”

Outcome

The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the findings that the real estate agent had not engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct. The appellants were ordered to pay the agent’s costs.

Key Takeaways

  • Disclaimers Matter: Clear and prominent disclaimers can shield agents from liability if they make it clear that the information is not independently verified and buyers should conduct their own inquiries.
  • Buyer Responsibility: Purchasers of high-value property are expected to conduct due diligence, particularly where professional advice is available.
  • Agent’s Role: Merely passing on third-party information with proper disclaimers does not constitute misleading or deceptive conduct.

References:

https://jade.io/article/68508


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Concrete Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd v Nelson [1990] HCA 17

Case name & citation: Concrete Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd v Nelson [1990] HCA 17; (1990) 169 CLR 594; 64 ALJR 293; 92 ALR 193

  • Court: High Court of Australia
  • Judgment Date: 3 May 1990
  • Legal Issue: Scope of Section 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) – Whether misleading or deceptive conduct occurred “in trade or commerce.”

Facts of Concrete Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd v Nelson

1. The appellant, Concrete Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd, was a company constructing a building in Sydney.

2. The respondent, Grant Nelson, was an employee working at the site. While removing a grate covering an air-conditioning shaft, he fell and suffered injuries.

3. Nelson alleged that his injuries were caused by misleading advice from his foreman, who incorrectly stated that the grates were securely bolted.

4. He brought a claim under Section 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), asserting that the company’s conduct was misleading or deceptive.

Procedural History

•            The Federal Court initially ruled in favour of Nelson, holding that his allegations fell within the scope of Section 52.

•            Concrete Constructions appealed to the High Court, arguing that the conduct did not occur “in trade or commerce” and was therefore outside the scope of Section 52.

Key Legal Issue

Does the misleading statement by the foreman to the employee constitute conduct “in trade or commerce” under Section 52 of the Trade Practices Act?

Decision in Concrete Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd v Nelson

The High Court allowed the appeal, ruling in favour of Concrete Constructions.

Reasoning

1. Interpretation of “In Trade or Commerce”:

Section 52 prohibits misleading or deceptive conduct “in trade or commerce.” The Court held that this phrase limits the section’s scope to conduct with a trading or commercial character, particularly dealings between businesses and consumers or suppliers. Internal communications within a corporation, such as between an employer and an employee, do not satisfy this requirement.

2. Application to the Case:

The misleading statement was an internal workplace instruction unrelated to any commercial or trading activity. As such, the conduct was not “in trade or commerce” and fell outside the scope of Section 52.

3. Purpose of Section 52:

The Court emphasized that the section’s primary purpose is to protect consumers and regulate misleading conduct in commercial transactions, not to govern internal corporate practices.

Case Outcome

The High Court answered the preliminary question in the negative, ruling that the facts did not give rise to a cause of action under Section 52. The appeal was allowed, and Nelson’s claim under the Trade Practices Act was dismissed.

Significance

This case clarified the meaning of “in trade or commerce” under Section 52, limiting its application to external commercial dealings and excluding internal corporate conduct. It remains a key authority on the scope of misleading or deceptive conduct under Australian trade practices law.

References:

http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/cth/HCA/1990/17.html


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Houghton v Arms [2006]: Trade Practices & Employee Liability

Houghton v Arms [2006] HCA 59; (2006) 225 CLR 553; 231 ALR 534

Court and Date

  • High Court of Australia
  • 13 December 2006
  • Trade Practices — Misleading or deceptive conduct in trade or commerce

Parties involved

  • Appellants: James Houghton and another employee of WSA Online Limited
  • Respondent: Simon Arms

Key Facts of Houghton v Arms

1. Simon Arms, trading as “Australian Cellar Door,” planned to set up a website for direct marketing of small wineries’ products, leveraging reduced sales tax and eliminating distributor margins.

2. Arms engaged WSA Online Limited for web design and related services.

3. James Houghton and another employee of WSA made representations about a payment processing facility, “ANZ e-Gate,” claiming it would meet Arms’ business needs.

4. These representations were misleading. The e-Gate system required additional steps (e.g., winery accreditation), which were not disclosed.

5. Arms’ business suffered losses because the undisclosed requirements made the initial business model unworkable.

Procedural History

1. Arms sued WSA Online, Houghton, and the other employee in the Federal Court of Australia.

2. The Federal Court:

  • Found WSA liable for misleading and deceptive conduct under Section 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).
  • Dismissed claims against the individual employees.

3. On appeal, the Full Court reversed the decision, holding the employees personally liable under Section 9 of the Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic), which applies to individuals.

4. Houghton and the other employee appealed to the High Court.

Legal Issues

1. Personal Liability of Employees: Can employees acting within the scope of their employment be personally liable under Section 9 of the Fair Trading Act for misleading or deceptive conduct?

2. Scope of “In Trade or Commerce”: Does the phrase encompass acts by employees performed on behalf of their employer?

High Court’s Findings in Houghton v Arms

1. Employees’ Liability:

Section 9 of the Fair Trading Act applies to “a person” engaging in misleading conduct in trade or commerce, which includes employees. Employment status does not shield individuals from liability for their own actions, even when performed within the scope of their employment. The misleading conduct of Houghton and his colleague fell within the scope of “trade or commerce.”

2. Concurrent Operation of Laws:

The Fair Trading Act complements the federal Trade Practices Act. Even though WSA was held liable under the federal act, the employees could still be liable under the state law.

3. Appeal Outcome:

The High Court dismissed the appeal. Houghton and his colleague remained personally liable for the damages of AUD 58,331 suffered by Arms.

Key Takeaway (Houghton v Arms)

Employees can be personally liable for misleading or deceptive conduct under consumer protection laws, even if acting within the scope of their employment. Misleading statements made in trade or commerce attract liability regardless of whether the person has an independent commercial interest.

Order made

Appeal dismissed with costs awarded to Simon Arms.

References:

https://jade.io/article/3476


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Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661: Case Summary

Case name & citation: Yorke v Lucas [1985] HCA 65; (1985) 158 CLR 661; 59 ALJR 776; 61 ALR 307

  • High Court of Australia
  • Judgment date: 3 October 1985
  • The bench of judges: Mason A.C.J., Wilson, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ.
  • Area of law: Trade practices; Misleading or deceptive conduct by corporation

The High Court of Australia decision in Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661 addresses important questions regarding liability for misleading or deceptive conduct under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), specifically sections 52, 75B, and 82.

Key Issues

Misleading or Deceptive Conduct: Section 52 prohibits corporations from engaging in conduct in trade or commerce that is misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive.

Liability for Involvement in Contravention: Section 75B defines persons “involved in a contravention” to include those who:

•            Aid, abet, counsel, or procure the contravention.

•            Induce the contravention.

•            Are knowingly concerned in or party to the contravention.

•            Conspire to effect the contravention.

Remedies: Section 82 provides for the recovery of damages for loss or damage caused by contraventions of the Act.

Case Facts

The appellants purchased a business from Treasureway Stores Pty. Ltd. The purchase was induced by false representations regarding the business’s average weekly turnover and gross profits. The appellants sued several parties, including Ross Melville Lucas, the managing director of Ross Lucas Pty. Ltd., for their involvement in the misleading conduct. Ross Lucas Pty. Ltd. acted as an agent for Treasureway Stores Pty. Ltd. in selling the business.

The trial judge found that:

1. Treasureway and its director, Kevin Mahoney, engaged in misleading conduct.

2. The Lucas company (as an agent) also contravened section 52, but its conduct was “unwitting.”

3. Lucas acted based on information provided by Mahoney, with no knowledge or reason to suspect the falsity of the information. He was found not liable.

High Court Decision in Yorke v Lucas

The High Court upheld the dismissal of the claim against Lucas, focusing on the interpretation of section 75B. Key points include:

1. Knowledge and Intent:

To be “involved in a contravention” under section 75B(a) (aiding, abetting, counseling, or procuring), intent is required. This intent arises from knowledge of the essential facts that constitute the contravention. Lucas did not have knowledge of the falsity of the representations and therefore lacked the necessary intent to be considered an aider or abettor.

2. Secondary Liability:

Under section 75B(c) (“knowingly concerned in”), liability similarly requires knowledge of the contravention’s essential facts. The Court held that Lucas did not meet this threshold.

3. Corporation’s Conduct:

The Lucas company was found to have contravened section 52 by passing on false information from Treasureway. However, as Lucas had no reason to suspect the falsity of the information, his personal liability was not established.

Implications (Yorke v Lucas)

The decision clarifies that individuals can only be held liable under section 75B for their involvement in a contravention if they possess knowledge of the relevant facts constituting the contravention. Merely passing on information, without knowing or suspecting its falsity, does not amount to aiding, abetting, or being knowingly concerned in misleading or deceptive conduct.

Conclusion

Lucas was found to have acted in good faith based on information provided by Mahoney, without knowledge of its falsity. This case emphasizes the importance of knowledge and intent in establishing liability for involvement in contraventions under the Trade Practices Act.

References:

https://jade.io/article/67232


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Yerkey v Jones [1939]: Guarantees & Marriage

Yerkey v Jones [1939] HCA 3; (1939) 63 CLR 649

  • Decision Date: 06 March 1939
  • High Court of Australia
  • Husband and Wife – Confidential relations – Guarantee-Equitable relief

The case Yerkey v Jones from the Supreme Court of South Australia addresses issues of husband-wife relationships, guarantees, and equitable relief, specifically under circumstances where a wife becomes surety for her husband’s debt. Here is a detailed summary:

Background

Parties Involved: John George Yerkey and his wife Mary Penelope Yerkey (plaintiffs) filed a claim against Florence May Blanche Jones and her husband, Estyn Jones (defendants).

Subject Property: The dispute involved a property in Payneham sold by the Yerkeys to Estyn Jones, with payment conditions including a second mortgage secured by Florence’s Walkerville property.

Key Facts (Yerkey v Jones)

1. Property Sale and Payment Structure:

The purchase price for the Payneham property was £3,500. Payment terms included a nominal deposit, £200 at the end of two years, and £3,300 at the end of three years. Of the final payment, £1,000 was secured by a second mortgage on Florence’s Walkerville property, which already had a first mortgage of £700.

2. Mrs. Jones’s Role:

Florence Jones was asked by her husband to execute the second mortgage for £1,000, which she agreed to after her husband’s persuasion. She claimed she did not fully comprehend the legal implications of the guarantee, particularly her personal liability beyond the property.

3. Execution of Documents:

On 21 August 1936, the couple met the Yerkeys and their solicitors to execute the sale and mortgage documents. At the solicitors’ office, all necessary documents were signed. While the solicitor explained the terms, Florence later contended that she signed under pressure and without adequate understanding.

4. Default and Litigation:

The Joneses defaulted on interest payments, and the Yerkeys initiated a claim to recover the secured amount. Florence defended on grounds of undue influence, misrepresentation, and lack of understanding.

Court Proceedings and Issues in Yerkey v Jones

Trial Court:

Justice Napier ruled in favour of Florence, holding that she signed under undue influence and misunderstanding of her obligations. The mortgage was deemed unenforceable against her.

Appeal:

The High Court of Australia reversed the trial court’s decision, concluding:

  • The relationship of husband and wife does not inherently presume undue influence.
  • The solicitor’s explanation was sufficient to establish Florence’s understanding of her obligations.
  • The Yerkeys acted in good faith and relied on reasonable legal procedures.

Principles Discussed

Undue Influence:

The relationship between husband and wife, while close, does not automatically lead to a presumption of undue influence. Specific proof of overbearing the will of the wife is required.

Equitable Relief for Misrepresentation:

Relief can be granted if a party is misled into signing a document without understanding its material implications. However, no misrepresentation by the Yerkeys was found.

Role of Creditors:

Creditors relying on guarantees obtained through spouses must ensure the guarantor comprehends their liabilities. In this case, the court found that reasonable care was taken.

Responsibility of Solicitors:

Solicitors should adequately explain contractual obligations. Here, the solicitor’s efforts were deemed appropriate, negating Florence’s claim of misunderstanding.

Conclusion

The High Court reinstated the plaintiffs’ claim, holding both Estyn and Florence Jones liable for the debt. The decision highlighted the balance between protecting individuals in close relationships and upholding valid contractual agreements entered knowingly.

References:

https://jade.io/article/64113


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What Did Geyer v Downs (1977) Decide on Supervision?

Case name & citation: Geyer v Downs [1977] HCA 64; (1977) 138 CLR 91

  • Court: High Court of Australia
  • Judges: Stephen, Mason, Jacobs, Murphy and Aickin JJ.
  • Judgment date: 9 December 1977

Geyer v Downs (1977) is a notable negligence case from the High Court of Australia. The case centers on the responsibility of a school headmaster for supervising students during a school morning session before classes begin.

Given below are the key points of the case.

The Incident (Geyer v Downs)

The incident occurred at Blacktown Primary School.

An 8-year-old student was struck on the head by a softball bat wielded by another student in the school playground at around 8:50 a.m., before classes had started. There was no teacher supervision at the time, and the playground was crowded with children.

Duty of Care

The case questions whether the headmaster owed a duty of care to the plaintiff (the injured student) before the official start of school hours (9:00 a.m.). The court concluded that the headmaster had a duty to supervise, given that the children were on school grounds, and the headmaster was aware that they regularly arrived early.

According to Murphy and Aickin JJ. (at p105) –

“The headmaster had created a factual situation in which he was under a duty to ensure that there was adequate supervision of the girls in the playground before 9.00 a.m. It is no answer to that claim to say that the ‘Daily Routine’ required supervision only after 9.00 a.m.”

Failure to Supervise

The headmaster had allowed children to enter the school grounds before 9:00 a.m., acknowledging the risks but not providing adequate supervision. His instructions to children to sit and read or talk quietly were not strictly enforced, and the children often played unsupervised.

Evidence of Breach

The court found that the headmaster’s failure to provide proper supervision or enforce his instructions contributed to the accident. The risk of injury was foreseeable, especially given the crowded and small playground.

As per Murphy and Aickin JJ. (at p103) –

“It is clear that the actual injury is of a kind which was foreseeable, as something which might result from the playing of softball in a small playground in which there were present between 100 and 150 unsupervised schoolgirls between the ages of eight and twelve.”

Court’s Decision in Geyer v Downs

The court concluded that the headmaster’s actions, or lack thereof, amounted to a breach of duty, and the plaintiff was entitled to damages. The appeal in favour of the headmaster was dismissed, and the original judgment of the jury in favour of the plaintiff was upheld.

In essence, the judgment clarifies that a duty of care exists even before the official school hours, and the failure to provide adequate supervision can result in liability for negligence.

References:

https://jade.io/article/66701


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Walter Vignoli v Sydney Harbour Casino [1999]: A Quick Summary

Walter Vignoli v Sydney Harbour Casino [1999] NSWSC 1113

The case Vignoli v Sydney Harbour Casino [1999] involved the tort of false imprisonment.

Walter Vignoli, a patron at the Sydney Harbour Casino, was detained by casino staff after being overpaid.

Facts

Walter Vignoli sued Sydney Harbour Casino for false imprisonment following an incident in June 1996. After being allegedly overpaid at a gaming table in the Endeavour Room, Mr. Vignoli tried unsuccessfully to verify the overpayment and leave the premises but was detained by casino security. The casino’s position was that he could leave only after returning the excess payment.

Judgment in Walter Vignoli v Sydney Harbour Casino

The court held that this constituted false imprisonment, as the detention lacked lawful justification, and merely providing an option to leave under certain conditions did not negate the unlawful nature of the confinement.

In November 1999, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of Mr. Vignoli, finding that the casino acted in a “high-handed” manner by unlawfully depriving him of liberty. He was awarded $30,000 in compensatory damages for the distress and humiliation caused by being falsely imprisoned for several hours, $10,000 by way of aggravated damages for the fact that the defendants decided to contest liability and force the plaintiff to endure a trial – despite it being obvious, and $35,000 in exemplary damages for false imprisonment.

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