Stevenson, Jaques & Co v McLean is a contract law case about whether a telegram asking for more information amounts to a counter-offer. Below is a short and clear summary of the case along with its key details.
- Case Name & Citation: Stevenson, Jaques & Co v McLean [1880] 5 QBD 346
- Court: Queen’s Bench Division (QBD)
- The learned Judge: Lush J
- Date decided: 1880
- Area of law: Contract law — offer and acceptance; counter-offers; communication of revocation and acceptance
Facts: Stevenson, Jaques & Co v McLean
McLean telegraphed an offer to sell iron at “40s., nett cash, open till Monday.”
On Monday morning (at 9:42 am) Stevenson Jaques & Co telegraphed asking “whether you would accept forty for delivery over two months; or, if not, longest limit you would give.”
McLean later sold the iron to a third party and telegraphed a revocation at 1:25 pm.
Before receiving that revocation, Stevenson sent an unconditional acceptance by telegram at 1:34 pm.
Litigation followed and Stevenson sued for breach when the goods were not delivered.
Key Legal Issues
Was Stevenson’s 9:42 am telegram a counter-offer (which would reject and kill McLean’s original offer) or merely an inquiry?
If McLean tried to revoke, was his revocation effective before Stevenson’s acceptance (i.e., is a revocation by telegraph effective when it is despatched/sent)?
Judgment (by Lush J) in Stevenson, Jaques & Co v McLean
The 9:42 am telegram was a request for information, not a counter-offer, so McLean’s original offer remained open. A revocation is not effective until communicated — McLean’s telegram of revocation had not reached Stevenson before Stevenson’s acceptance — therefore a binding contract was formed and the plaintiffs succeeded.
Stevenson, Jaques & Co sent their acceptance by telegram at 1:34 p.m. The court held that because McLean’s revocation had not yet been received by the plaintiffs at 1:34 p.m., the offer remained open, and therefore the acceptance at 1:34 p.m. resulted in a binding contract.
Ratio / Legal principles
Inquiry ≠ counter-offer. A mere request for information does not terminate the original offer; the offeree can still accept the original terms later.
Revocation must be communicated. An offeror may revoke before acceptance, but revocation is ineffective until it actually reaches the offeree (relying on authorities such as Byrne v Van Tienhoven).
Practical Significance
This case is frequently cited in contract-formation discussions to distinguish counter-offers from mere enquiries (contrast with Hyde v Wrench). It confirms that communications (including telegrams) are governed by the ordinary principle that revocation must be communicated to be effective — a useful rule where instantaneous or near-instant communications are used.
References:
- https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=2947&context=penn_law_review
- https://s3.studentvip.com.au/notes/6696-sample.pdf
- https://ipsaloquitur.com/contract-law/cases/stevenson-jaques-v-mclean/
- https://s3.studentvip.com.au/notes/2933-sample.pdf
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Ruchi is a legal research writer with an academic background in CA, MBA (Finance), and M.Com. She specializes in digesting and summarizing complex judicial decisions into clear and structured case notes for students and legal professionals.
