Break Fast Investments v PCH Melbourne (2007): Property Rights

Given below is a clear and simple summary of the case Break Fast Investments Pty Ltd v PCH Melbourne Pty Ltd [2007] VSCA 311.

Break Fast Investments Pty Ltd v PCH Melbourne Pty Ltd [2007] VSCA 311; (2007) 20 VR 311

  • Court: Supreme Court of Victoria – Court of Appeal
  • Judgment Date: 21st December, 2007
  • Judges: ASHLEY and DODDS-STREETON JJA and CAVANOUGH AJA
  • Legal Focus: Trespass to land, Encroachment into airspace, Damages or Injunction, Property Law

Background: Break Fast Investments v PCH Melbourne

Break Fast Investments Pty Ltd (the appellant) owned a 12-storey office building.

PCH Melbourne Pty Ltd (the respondent) owned the neighbouring property, which included the heritage-listed MCG Hotel and vacant land for development. In the future, PCH wanted to build a multistorey building up to the edge of its land.

Break Fast had added metal cladding to its building, which protruded 3–6 cm into PCH’s airspace.

PCH argued this was a trespass and sought removal. Break Fast argued it was minor (“trifling”), and damages should be paid instead of a mandatory injunction.

Trial Court Decision

The trial judge found that the cladding did encroach into PCH’s airspace and this was not trivial.

Since the encroachment interfered with PCH’s future potential to build up to the boundary, it was a serious trespass.

It granted a mandatory injunction requiring removal of the cladding.

Appeal Arguments by Break Fast

Break Fast argued the trespass was small and trivial.

Damages should replace the injunction.

Removal would cost about $300,000, causing hardship.

They also offered undertakings to remove cladding if ever PCH developed its land.

Court of Appeal’s Findings (Break Fast Investments v PCH Melbourne)

Trespass was confirmed – even small intrusions into airspace can be trespass if they interfere with the ordinary use of land.

It was not trivial – the cladding prevented PCH from fully using its land for future development.

Damages were not appropriate – allowing damages would mean Break Fast effectively “buys” rights over PCH’s land without consent.

Hardship ($300k cost) did not outweigh PCH’s rights.

The Court applied the “good working rule” from Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co.—injunctions are the prima facie remedy for trespass, and damages are awarded only in exceptional cases. For example, if the trespass is trivial, easily compensable in money, and an injunction would be oppressive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the mandatory injunction requiring Break Fast to remove the cladding.

Key Legal Principle

Even a small building intrusion (just a few centimeters) into a neighbor’s airspace can be trespass. Courts usually order removal (injunction) rather than just awarding damages, because property rights are strongly protected.

References:

https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/vic/VSCA/2007/311.html


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Jaggard v Sawyer [1995]: Key Takeaways for Property Law

Jaggard v Sawyer [1995] 1 WLR 269 is a leading English case on remedies for breach of restrictive covenants. Here’s a summary of the case.

Case Name: Jaggard v Sawyer and Another
Citations: [1995] 2 All ER 189; [1995] 1 WLR 269; [1995] 1 EGLR 146; [1995] 13 EG 132; [1994] EGCS 139; [1994] EWCA Civ 1
Court: Court of Appeal (Civil Division), England and Wales
Judges: Sir Thomas Bingham MR (Master of the Rolls), Kennedy LJ, Millett LJ
Date: 18 July 1994
Areas of Law: Property Law, Restrictive Covenants, Trespass, Injunctions vs. Damages

Facts of the Case: Jaggard v Sawyer

Ashleigh Avenue in Dorset was a private cul-de-sac developed with 10 houses, subject to restrictive covenants binding all owners.

Mr. and Mrs. Sawyer (defendants) owned No. 5 and wanted a larger home. They bought land behind their property (from 13 Bull Lane) to build a new house (No. 5A). They created a driveway through their existing garden to give No. 5A access to Ashleigh Avenue.

Mrs. Jaggard (plaintiff), owner of No. 1, objected, arguing that the driveway breached covenants. The use of Ashleigh Avenue by No. 5A was trespass (since the road was private).

Despite objections, the Sawyers built No. 5A. By the time proceedings were brought, the house was nearly complete.

County Court Decision

The trial judge held Ashleigh Avenue was indeed private. The Sawyers’ use of it was trespass and breach of covenant. But instead of granting an injunction (which would effectively make No. 5A landlocked), the judge awarded damages in lieu under s.50 Supreme Court Act 1981.

Damages were assessed at what a reasonable sum would have been for release of the right of way: £6,250 (split among residents).

Mrs. Jaggard appealed, insisting an injunction should have been granted.

Court of Appeal Decision (Jaggard v Sawyer)

The appeal was dismissed.

Normally, a person whose property rights are infringed is entitled to an injunction.

However, following Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895], damages may be substituted if the injury is small, measurable in money, can be adequately compensated by money, and an injunction would be oppressive to the defendant.

The Court of Appeal held all four conditions were satisfied here. Extra traffic from one additional house was minimal. Mrs. Jaggard’s concerns could be addressed with money. An injunction would have been oppressive, since it would render No. 5A useless and destroy the Sawyers’ home.

Outcome:

Mrs. Jaggard’s appeal was dismissed. The Sawyers kept access to No. 5A via Ashleigh Avenue, but had to pay damages.

Key Principles Applied in this Case

Courts have discretion (under Lord Cairns’ Act and s.50 Supreme Court Act 1981) to award damages instead of injunctions, especially where an injunction would be disproportionate.

Shelfer test provides a framework for when damages should replace injunctions.

Courts will consider the reality at the time of trial—if a building is already complete, courts are reluctant to order remedies that destroy it.

References:

https://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1994/1.html


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Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287

Here’s a quick summary of Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287 with the key rule that it is famous for.

Key Facts – Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co

The City of London Electric Lighting Co set up large engines and plant next to premises occupied by Shelfer. The vibration, noise and excavation caused structural damage and serious annoyance to Shelfer and his family.

Legal Issue

Shelfer sued for nuisance and sought an injunction to stop the activity (and also claimed damages). At first instance (Kekewich J) the judge awarded damages and refused an injunction; the question on appeal was whether an injunction should instead have been granted or whether damages in lieu were adequate.

Decision (Court of Appeal)

The Court of Appeal (including Lindley LJ and A.L. Smith LJ) set aside the trial judge’s refusal to grant an injunction and clarified when damages can be awarded instead of an injunction. On the facts, the injunction was ordered.

The “Shelfer” rule (the classic four-part test)

A.L. Smith LJ formulated the often-quoted working rule that damages in lieu of an injunction may be appropriate only where all of the following are satisfied:

  1. the injury to the plaintiff’s legal right is small;
  2. the injury is one capable of being estimated in money;
  3. the injury can be adequately compensated by a small money payment; and
  4. it would be oppressive to the defendant to grant an injunction.

Significance (Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co)

Shelfer became the leading authority for when courts might refuse an injunction and award damages instead. However, the rule has been described as a working guide rather than a rigid formula — and in Coventry v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13 the Supreme Court discouraged slavish or mechanistic application of Shelfer, favouring a more flexible discretionary approach to whether to grant an injunction or award damages.

References:


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