Hardman v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary [1986]

Hardman v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary [1986] Crim LR 330
Crown Court

What happened in the case?

In the case of Hardman v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary [1986] Crim LR 330, the defendants, who were members of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), participated in a protest by painting human silhouettes on a pavement using water-soluble paint. The paint was specifically designed so that it would wash off with rainwater after a few days, but before this could occur, the local council employed workers to clean the pavement, incurring costs in doing so.

The defendants were charged and convicted of criminal damage under the Criminal Damage Act 1971. They appealed on the basis that the paint was temporary and would have naturally worn away without the need for any remedial action, arguing that no permanent damage had been caused.

Legal Issue

The issue before the court was whether this temporary paint amounted to “criminal damage” under the Criminal Damage Act 1971.

Judgment in Hardman v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary

The court held that the act did indeed amount to criminal damage, despite the fact that the paint could be easily washed off. The reasoning was that the damage need not be permanent to constitute an offence under the Criminal Damage Act 1971. The key point was that the local authority had incurred expense and inconvenience in cleaning the pavement to restore it to its original condition. This expenditure of resources was sufficient to establish that criminal damage had occurred.

This case set a precedent that “damage” includes temporary harm, and even if it can be remedied easily, the incurring of costs to restore the property suffices for criminal damage.

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R v Fiak [2005] EWCA Crim 2381 Court of Appeal

Case name & citation: R v Fiak [2005] EWCA Crim 2381

Court: Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)
Judgment Date: 11 October 2005

What is the case about?

The case of R v Fiak [2005] EWCA Crim 2381 concerns an appeal by Engin Fiak against his conviction for two offenses: criminal damage to a police blanket and cell, and assault of a police officer, PC Alison Smith, with intent to avoid lawful detention.

Facts of the case (R v Fiak)

The incident occurred when police officers found Fiak intoxicated in his car. When approached by police, Fiak attempted to return to his home, insisting he had committed no offense. A struggle ensued when officers tried to detain him. Eventually, he was arrested for being in charge of a vehicle while under the influence of drink or drugs and for assaulting PC Smith during the struggle.

While in custody, Fiak flooded his cell by placing a blanket down the toilet and flushing it repeatedly. He was accused for causing criminal damage to the blanket and the cell.

Arguments and Court’s Judgment

Fiak argued that the arrest was unlawful as the officers did not explicitly use the word “arrest” before restraining him. However, the court ruled that the restraint was lawful, as the officers had reasonable grounds to suspect an offense, and the formal use of the word “arrest” was not necessary for detention.

Regarding the charge of criminal damage, it was argued that the blanket was not visibly soiled and that the water causing the flooding was clean. However, the court determined that the actions of Fiak rendered the blanket unusable (until it was cleaned and dry) and necessitated cleaning of the cells, constituting criminal damage.

Sir Igor Judge referred to the precedent set in Morphitis v Salmon [1990], which articulated that damage can include situations where the utility of an item is temporarily impaired. In this case, the police cell could not be utilized until it was dried out. The blanket and the police cell had been damaged under the relevant legal provisions.

Hence, the appeal was dismissed, and the convictions were affirmed.

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A (A Juvenile) v R [1978] in Criminal Law: Case Summary

Case name & citation: A (A Juvenile) v R [1978] Crim LR 689 (Crown Court)

Jurisdiction: England and Wales

What happened in this case?

In A (A Juvenile) v R [1978] Crim LR 689, the defendant was charged with criminal damage after spitting on a police officer’s raincoat. The issue before the Crown Court was whether spitting on the coat could constitute criminal damage under the Criminal Damage Act 1971.

Judgment of the Court in A (A Juvenile) v R

The court held that the act of spitting on the garment could, in principle, cause damage. However, the judgment emphasized that the nature of the garment must be considered. The court reasoned that if spitting occurred on a delicate item, such as a satin wedding dress, any attempt to remove the spit could leave a mark or stain, rendering the item ‘imperfect’ or requiring professional cleaning. In such a case, criminal damage could be established.

In the present case, however, the raincoat was a service garment designed to withstand the elements. The court concluded that the spit could be easily wiped off with a damp cloth without leaving any trace or causing lasting damage.

Conclusion

Thus, the court held that the spitting in this case was too minor to constitute criminal damage, as defined under the Criminal Damage Act 1971.

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Roper v Knott [1898]: A Quick Case Summary

Case citation: Roper v Knott [1898] 1 QB 868

Court: Queen’s Bench

Facts (Roper v Knott)

The defendant, D, was a milk salesman who worked for a business. D was accused of watering down the milk before selling it. The Magistrate was of the opinion that this act was fraudulent, as it increased the bulk of the milk, allowing D to sell more and thereby increase his profits.

Legal Issue

Whether D’s actions constituted malicious damage to property under the law.

Decision in Roper v Knott

The court held that D was guilty of malicious damage to property.

The court clarified that damage does not need to render the property completely useless. It is sufficient that the value of the property has been impaired. D’s actions were found to be deliberate and intentional, contributing to the court’s decision to uphold the conviction. The act of watering down the milk impaired its value, which was deemed enough to constitute damage under the law.

Conclusion

The conviction of D was upheld, establishing that any impairment of value to property can be considered damage, not necessarily requiring the property to be rendered entirely useless.

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Roe v Kingerlee [1986]: A Brief Case Summary

Roe v Kingerlee [1986] Crim LR 735

Divisional Court of QBD

This case of 1986 concerns itself with how “damage” should be interpreted in criminal law.

Facts of the case (Roe v Kingerlee)

The defendant was charged with criminal damage for smearing mud on the wall of a police cell. The mud did not cause permanent harm, but it cost £7 to clean it off. Initially, the magistrates dismissed the charge, concluding that D’s actions did not amount to criminal damage.

Issue

The key issue in this case was whether the act of smearing mud on a wall, which required cleaning but did not cause permanent harm, could be considered criminal damage.

Judgment in Roe v Kingerlee

The Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division overturned the earlier decision, stating that whether an act constitutes criminal damage is a “matter of fact and degree”, and it is for the justices to decide, using their common sense. Importantly, the court clarified that damage does not need to be permanent to qualify as criminal damage; the fact that expense was incurred to restore the property was sufficient.

Significance

This case sets a precedent that criminal damage does not have to involve significant or permanent harm. Even minor, temporary acts of damage—if they would require time, effort, or money to fix—can be considered criminal damage.

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Samuels v Stubbs (1972): A Quick Summary

Case citation: Samuels v Stubbs (1972) 4 SASR 200

Court: Supreme Court (South Australia)
The learned judge: Walters J
Area of law: Criminal damage

This is an Australian case that deals with the interpretation of “damage” in the context of criminal damage to property.

Facts of the case

In Samuels v Stubbs (1972) 4 SASR 200, the respondent was charged with criminal damage to a police constable’s cap after kicking and jumping on it with both feet during a protest. The cap became crushed and did not return to its original shape. It was left in a “semi-crushed” condition. It was though possible to correct it without considerable effort or cost.

The charge was brought under s 43 of the then Police Offences Act 1953 (SA), which stated that: “Any person who wilfully and without lawful authority destroys or damages any property shall be guilty of an offence. Penalty: Fifty pounds or imprisonment for three months.”

Issue

The key question was whether the damage caused to the police constable’s cap—when it was kicked and jumped on by the respondent—constituted “criminal damage”.

Decision of the Court in Samuels v Stubbs

The Special Magistrate initially dismissed the charge, holding that the cap had not suffered “actual damage.” However, on appeal, Walters J reversed this decision.

His Honour emphasized that the term “damage” does not require proof of permanent harm or that the property is rendered entirely useless. Instead, it suffices if the item suffers “temporary functional derangement,” meaning its ability to serve its normal purpose has been temporarily impaired. In this case, the fact that the cap was crushed and could no longer (at the time) be worn in its normal state amounted to such a derangement.

Hence, the respondent was held responsible for criminal damage.

Waiters J held (at 203) that:

“It is my view, however, the word “damages”, as it is used in s 43, is sufficiently wide in its meaning to embrace injury, mischief or harm done to property, and that in order to constitute “damage” it is unnecessary to establish such definite or actual damage as renders the property useless, or prevents it from serving its normal function – in this case, prevents the cap from being worn. In my opinion, it is sufficient proof of damage if the evidence proves a temporary functional derangement of the particular article of property.”

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Morphitis v Salmon [1990]: A Case Summary

Morphitis v Salmon [1990] Crim LR 48

Morphitis v Salmon [1990] Crim LR 48 is a significant case in English criminal law, particularly concerning the interpretation of “criminal damage” under the Criminal Damage Act 1971.

Facts of the Case (Morphitis v Salmon)

In this case, the defendant was involved in a confrontation where he had removed a metal scaffold bar from a neighboring site. During this, the bar was scratched. The prosecution claimed this amounted to criminal damage.

Legal Issue

The primary issue before the court was whether causing a scratch or minor damage to property, in this case, the scaffold bar, amounted to “criminal damage” under the law.

Decision in Morphitis v Salmon

Auld J held that whether damage is caused is a question of fact and degree.

The Divisional Court ruled that not all physical alterations to property constitute criminal damage. The court held that superficial marks or scratches that do not impair the functionality or usefulness of the property do not amount to criminal damage. In the specific case of the scaffold bar, while it was scratched, the scratch did not affect the bar’s utility or value. Therefore, it was not considered criminal damage.

The Court was clear that dismantling the scaffolding (or any structure/barrier) could amount to criminal damage, as it would impair the usefulness of the barrier. The focus here was on the loss of function, which is a broader interpretation of damage—covering not just physical harm but also temporary or permanent impairment of value or utility. The Court held that the scratch itself was not criminal damage, but had the charge focused on the removal or dismantling of the barrier, a conviction could have been upheld. In other words, a stronger case could have been there had the defendant been charged with dismantling the barrier.

Legal Principle

The ruling established that for something to qualify as criminal damage, it must affect the usefulness, value, or normal function of the property, not just cause a superficial alteration or aesthetic harm.

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Barker v The Queen (1983): A Case Summary

Barker v The Queen [1983] HCA 18; (1983) 153 CLR 338

Court: High Court of Australia
Decided on: 7 June 1983
Judges: Mason, Murphy, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ.
Area of law: Burglary; Entering building as a trespasser with intent to steal

This case involves a legal question under section 76 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Victoria). For conviction of burglary under the said section: two elements viz. intent to steal and trespassing are necessary. The intent to steal was present but the question was: whether a person who has limited authority to enter premises but enters with intent to steal is considered a “trespasser.”

Facts of the case (Barker v The Queen)

In December 1979, Curl went on vacation and asked his neighbour, the applicant, to keep an eye on his house. He provided the applicant with a concealed key and authority to enter the house if necessary. While Curl was away, his sons visited the house and found the applicant and another man, McFarlane, there. The applicant claimed to be fixing windows. The next day, the sons discovered many items missing and notified the police. The applicant and McFarlane were charged with burglary.

Curl confirmed that the applicant had authority to enter the house but not to remove any items, although he conceded that the applicant could have done so if it was necessary for preservation. The applicant admitted taking the goods but claimed he did so to protect them. The jury, however, convicted him of burglary, rejecting his explanation and concluding that he had entered the house with the intent to steal.

The trial judge instructed the jury that if the applicant entered the house with the intent to steal, his purpose was beyond the authority given by Curl and thus constituted trespassing. His leave to appeal was refused by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Victoria. The applicant then sought a special leave to appeal to the High Court.

The legal issue

The key question was whether someone who is given limited authority to enter a property becomes a trespasser if they enter with intent to steal.

Relevant section

Section 76 of the Crimes Act provides:

“(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters any building or part of a building as a trespasser with intent – (a) to steal anything in the building or part in question; or (b) to commit an offence – (i) involving an assault to a person in the building or part in question; or (ii) involving any damage to the building or to property in the building or part in question –

which is punishable with imprisonment for a term of five years or more …….”

High Court’s Findings in Barker v The Queen

The Court agreed with the trial proceedings.

It held that the concept of trespass under common law is well established, with trespass being defined as entry onto another’s land without authority or right. Even when permission is granted, if the individual enters the premises for a purpose not authorized by the permission (in this case, theft or especially where that purpose is unlawful), that person becomes a trespasser. This is supported by case law such as Reg. v. Jones and Smith (1976), where the English Court of Appeal held that entering premises with the intention to steal, even if permission to enter was initially given, can render the person a trespasser.

Thus, under section 76 of the Crimes Act 1958, the applicant can be considered a trespasser because, while initially authorized to enter, his intent to steal exceeded the scope of the permission granted, rendering his entry unauthorized and, therefore, unlawful. The conviction for burglary under the said section is, hence, supported by the legal definition of trespass.

The court granted special leave to appeal but ultimately dismissed the appeal.

Quote from the case

“Accordingly, ………… the common law principle that a person who enters premises for a purpose alien to the terms of a licence given to him to enter the premises enters as a trespasser. It is a matter of determining the scope of the authority to enter, which the licence or invitation confers. If a person enters for a purpose outside the scope of the authority, then he stands in no better position than a person who enters with no authority at all. His entry is unrelated to the authority.”

(By Mason J. at p346)

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