Bourhill v Young [1943] AC 92 is a seminal decision in UK tort law that defines the scope of duty of care, notably in the context of psychiatric harm sustained by bystanders.
The principle that the case emphasizes is –
“A duty only arises towards persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation.” (Lord Atkin, applied from Donoghue v Stevenson)
| Citations: [1943] AC 92, [1942] UKHL 5, 1942 SC (HL) 78 |
| Court: House of Lords |
| Date Decided: 5th August 1942 |
| Judges: Lord Thankerton, Lord Russell of Killowen, Lord Macmillan, Lord Wright and Lord Porter |
| Legal Focus: Negligence, Psychiatric Harm, Duty of Care, Foreseeability, Proximity, Nervous Shock |
Facts of the Case
On 11 October 1938, Mr. Young was riding his motorcycle negligently along a road in Edinburgh and collided with a car, resulting in his death. At the time, Mrs. Bourhill, who was eight months pregnant, was alighting from a tram approximately 15 meters (about 50 feet) away from the accident scene. She did not witness the collision but heard the crash and later approached the site after Mr. Young’s body had been removed, seeing the blood on the road. Subsequently, she suffered psychiatric harm and gave birth to a stillborn child, attributing her condition to the shock from the incident. She filed a negligence claim against Mr. Young’s estate, seeking damages for her psychiatric injury.
Legal Issue
The central legal question was whether Mr. Young owed a duty of care to Mrs. Bourhill, a bystander who suffered psychiatric harm without being in physical danger or directly witnessing the accident.
Decision in Bourhill v Young
The House of Lords held that Mr. Young did not owe a duty of care to Mrs. Bourhill.
The court reasoned that it was not reasonably foreseeable that a person in Mrs. Bourhill’s position would suffer psychiatric harm as a result of Mr. Young’s negligent act. (Foreseeability)
The court affirmed that her shock-induced injuries were too remote. Mrs. Bourhill was not in the immediate area of danger, nor did she witness the accident directly. Her position behind the tram meant she was shielded from the physical consequences of the collision. (Proximity)
Lord Wright stated as under:
“It is not every emotional disturbance or every shock which should have been foreseen. The driver of a car or vehicle even though careless is entitled to assume that the ordinary frequenter of the streets has sufficient fortitude to endure such incidents as may from time to time be expected to occur in them, including the noise of a collision and the sight of injury to others, and is not to be considered negligent towards one who does not possess the customary phlegm.”
List of references:
- https://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/uk/cases/UKHL/1942/5.html
- https://www.lawteacher.net/cases/bourhill-v-young.php
- https://digestiblenotes.com/law/tort_cases/duty_of_care.php
- https://professionalnegligenceclaimsolicitors.co.uk/duty-of-care-key-tort-law-judgment-bournhill-young/
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Ruchi is a legal research writer with an academic background in CA, MBA (Finance), and M.Com. She specializes in digesting and summarizing complex judicial decisions into clear and structured case notes for students and legal professionals.