A Case Analysis of Plenty v Dillon [1991]
The case, Plenty v Dillon, revolves around whether police officers had the legal right to enter the plaintiff’s farm to serve a summons on his daughter, despite him expressly revoking any implied consent for them to do so.
Case name & citation: Plenty v Dillon [1991] HCA 5; (1991) 171 CLR 635
- Decided on: 07 March 1991
- Court: High Court of Australia
- The bench of judges: Mason C.J., Brennan, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ.
- Area of law: Trespass; Revocation of implied licence to enter
Facts of the case (Plenty v Dillon)
Mr. Plenty owned a farm in Napperby, South Australia, and was involved in a legal matter concerning his 14-year-old daughter. In July 1978, a complaint was filed against her under the Juvenile Courts Act 1971-1975 (S.A.), alleging she needed care and control following an offense. A summons for the child to appear before a Juvenile Court was issued and attempted to be served by the police under the Justices Act 1921-1975 (S.A.).
The police first attempted to serve the summons on the child personally on October 6 and then by non-personal service on October 31 by leaving it with her father. The child did not appear in court. Instead of re-serving the summons, the magistrate ordered a fresh summons and issued notices to Mr. and Mrs. Plenty to attend the hearing.
Constables Dillon and Will went to Mr. Plenty’s farm to serve the fresh summons. Mr. Plenty had explicitly revoked any implied consent for police officers to enter his property for serving the summons. Mr. Plenty then sued the officers for trespassing.
Issue
The central legal issue was whether police officers could enter the farm to serve the summons without Mr. Plenty’s consent or any implied license.
Analysis of the principles
The court referred to the principle from Entick v. Carrington (1765), which states that any invasion of private property is a trespass unless justified by law. This principle applies to all, including those acting under the authority of the Crown, such as police officers.
The general rule is that a person who enters premises without the express or implied consent of the occupier is a trespasser. But certain common law and statutory exceptions permit entry without consent. For example, the third rule in Semayne’s Case (1604) allows a sheriff to break into a house to execute the King’s process, like an arrest warrant, but this does not extend to serving a summons.
The court distinguished between coercive process (like an arrest warrant) and non-coercive process (like a summons), emphasizing that serving a summons does not coerce the individual to appear but merely notifies them of the need to appear.
Judgment in Plenty v Dillon
The court found no common law or statutory provision that authorized the police officers to enter Mr. Plenty’s property without his consent (or without any implied licence) to serve the summons. The court concluded that the officers’ entry onto Mr. Plenty’s property was unauthorized and constituted a trespass.
Mr. Plenty was entitled to damages for the trespass. The case was remitted to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia for the assessment of damages and determination of costs.
Quote from the case
“The common law has a number of exceptions to the general rule that a person is a trespasser unless that person enters premises with the consent, express or implied, of the occupier. Thus, a constable or citizen can enter premises for the purpose of making an arrest if a felony has been committed and the felon has been followed to the premises. A constable or citizen can also enter premises to prevent the commission of a felony, and a constable can enter premises to arrest an offender running away from an affray. Moreover, a constable or citizen can enter premises to prevent a murder occurring. In these cases, there is power not only to enter premises but, where necessary, to break into the premises. However, it is a condition of any lawful breaking of premises that the person seeking entry has demanded and been refused entry by the occupier. See Swales v. Cox (1981) QB 849, at p 853. Furthermore, a constable, holding a warrant to arrest, may enter premises forcibly, if necessary, for the purpose of executing the warrant provided that the constable has first signified “the cause of his coming, and … (made) request to open doors”: Semayne’s Case, at p 91b (p 195 of ER); Burdett v. Abbot (1811) 14 East 1, at pp 158, 162-163 (104 ER 501, at pp 561, 563); Lippl v. Haines (1989) 18 NSWLR 620, at p 631.”
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